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INTRODUCTION 
On Tuesday, June 25, 2013, Texas State Senator Wendy Davis 
led a nearly thirteen-hour filibuster. In the special session of the Texas 
Senate, Davis’s filibuster halted the passage of a bill that would make 
abortions after twenty weeks illegal and would impose other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2015; B.A., University of 
Florida, 2012. Special thanks to the editors of the Northwestern Journal of Law and 
Social Policy who helped prepare this article for publication. 
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restrictions on abortion administration in Texas.1 Davis’s goal was to 
prevent the Texas Senate from passing the bill by running out the 
clock on the Senate session in which voting on Senate Bill 5 needed 
to occur.2 Using the filibuster in the state and federal Senate to block 
passage of a bill may be a long-used tactic,3 but Davis’s filibuster 
went beyond the normal vote-blocking practice because of her use of 
social media to garner public attention in the process.4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Christy Hoppe, After 12 1/2-Hour Filibuster, Senate Bill 5 is Dead, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS (June 25, 2013, 6:32 PM), 
http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2013/06/wendy-davis-begins-filibuster-to-
stop-omnibus-abortion-bill.html/; Manny Fernandez, Filibuster in Texas Senate 
Tries to Halt Abortion Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/politics/senate-democrats-in-texas-try-
blocking-abortion-bill-with-filibuster.html?_r=0. 
2 Fernandez, supra note 1.  
3 See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
181, 183-84 (1997) (“Generally speaking, a filibuster is the strategic use of delay to 
block legislation, to obstruct a nomination, to force an amendment, or to prompt 
other Senate action.”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE 
L.J. 483, 496 (1995) (“[T]he rules of the Senate have allowed for filibusters since 
the early republic. In fact, the first filibuster was attempted in the First Congress.”). 
4 The Washington Post reported that Davis’s “tweetstorm,” or social media 
campaign, leading up to and during her filibuster was planned by Davis’s supporters 
to garner attention for her cause. The article gave this example of how pro-choice 
supporters of Davis encouraged people to spread the word:  
If you are NOT in Austin and cannot get here, tweet and retweet 
your support for us,” one local activist wrote on her blog. “The 
anti-brigade is out in force … Don’t engage them, just tweet your 
support for what we are doing. Tweet at positive public figures, 
get us trending and raise the signal for women’s rights. 
TWEETSTORM them out of business, y’all! 
Caitlin Dewey, Wendy Davis ‘Tweetstorm’ was Planned in Advance, WASH. POST 
(June 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/06/26/this-
tweetstorm-was-planned-in-advance/.  
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Following Davis’s filibuster, Texas Governor Rick Perry called 
a second special session where the legislature passed the bill5 and 
Governor Perry signed the bill into law.6 After the filibuster, Davis 
used the momentum to compete in the 2014 Texas gubernatorial 
election. 7  Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health 
Services filed a lawsuit against the bill, and the Fifth Circuit held the 
bill constitutional, allowing the bill to go into effect on October 29, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Matt Smith & Joe Sutton, Perry Renews Texas Abortion Battle with Special 
Session, CNN (June 28, 2013, 7:29 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/26/politics/texas-abortion-bill/ (“Perry said the 
Legislature would convene July 1 in special session to take up the abortion bill, 
which was declared dead before dawn Wednesday. The bill failed after a night of 
drama in Austin during which a lone lawmaker talked for more than 10 hours in an 
attempt to run out the clock on a special session.”); Manny Fernandez, Abortion 
Restrictions Become Law in Texas, but Opponents Will Press Fight, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/perry-signs-texas-abortion-
restrictions-into-law.html.  
6 Fernandez, supra note 5 (“Gov. Rick Perry signed a bill into law Thursday 
giving Texas some of the toughest restrictions on abortion in the country, even as 
women’s rights advocates vowed to challenge the law’s legality in court.”); see Act 
of July 12, 2013, 83rd Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 1, §§ 1–12, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 
4795–802 (West) (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 
171.0031, 171.041–048, 171.061–064, & amending § 245.010.011; TEX. OCC. 
CODE amending §§ 164.052 & 164 .055).  
7 Sean Sullivan, Texas State Sen. Wendy Davis Announces Campaign for 
Governor, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-10-
03/politics/42661649_1_fort-worth-democrat-abortion-filibuster (“Fourteen weeks 
and two days after Texas state Sen. Wendy Davis catapulted onto the national radar 
with her protracted fight against abortion restrictions, the Democrat announced her 
campaign for governor Thursday, emphasizing her commitment to education.”); 
Manny Fernandez, Wendy Davis Enters Race for Texas Governor With a Shorter 
Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/us/politics/entering-race-for-texas-governor-
with-a-shorter-speech.html (“Exactly 100 days after the legislative filibuster that 
defied the Republican establishment and turned her into a Democratic star, State 
Senator Wendy Davis announced Thursday that she would run for governor, 
opening an underdog campaign to lead a state that last sent a Democrat to the 
governor’s mansion nearly 23 years ago.”); WENDY DAVIS FOR TEXAS, 
http://www.wendydavistexas.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).  
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2013.8  As of this writing, the parties are still litigating various issues 
of the lawsuit.9 The passage of the bill, the ensuing lawsuit (which 
some have speculated will be appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court),10 and Davis continue to receive mainstream media coverage.11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 
F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013), rev’g 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013); Erik 
Eckholm, In Reversal, Court Allows Texas Law on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 
2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/us/most-of-law-on-abortion-is-
reinstated-in-texas.html (“Only three days after a federal judge blocked a new Texas 
law that threatened to shut down many of the state’s abortion clinics, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, reversed the decision, 
saying the rule should take effect while the case is argued in the months to come.”).  
9 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs., 734 F.3d at 418; 
Eckholm, supra note 8. 
10 Rick Jervis, Texas Abortion Ruling Could Lead to National Fight, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 1, 2013, 9:30 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/01/texas-abortion-ruling-
supreme-Court/3358269/ (“The fact that the 5th Circuit strayed from other rulings on 
this issue makes the case a likely candidate for the U.S. Supreme Court, [policy 
analyst with the Guttmacher Institute Elizabeth] Nash said. ‘It's a huge sea-change,’ 
she said. ‘To allow this kind of law to go into effect during a court case is a very 
different approach to what we've been seeing in other court cases on the same 
subject.’”); Becca Aaronson, Final Arguments Made in Case on Abortion 
Regulations, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.texastribune.org/2013/10/23/Court-hears-debate-constitutionality-
abortion-law/. 
Yeakel will be the first judge—but probably not the last—to rule 
on whether the provisions are constitutional. Yeakel, who gave no 
specific indication Wednesday on when he would rule, said 
Monday that he expects that whichever side is disappointed with 
his ruling to appeal the decision, probably all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
Id. 
11 E.g., Jay Root, Spotlight on Davis, Democrats’ Big Hope, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 
1, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/09/01/spotlight-democrats-big-hope/; 
Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Strict Texas Abortion Law Takes Effect, L.A.  TIMES (Oct. 
31, 2013, 10:21 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-texas-abortion-
20131101,0,5492316.story#axzz2jWOwShSY; William M. Welch, Court Reinstates 
Most of Texas’ Abortion Restrictions, USA TODAY (Oct. 31, 2013, 11:27 PM), 
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Had Davis not incorporated a social media campaign alongside her 
filibuster, the Act, although extremely controversial in its own right 
because of the anti-abortion measures it contains, may not have 
entered the public’s consciousness as significantly.12  
Davis’s filibuster and coordinated social media campaign serve 
as an interesting model for examining the use of social media in the 
legislative process and the modern application of the Speech or 
Debate Clause of Article One of the United States Constitution.13 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/31/texas-abortion/3331201/; 
Catalina Camia, Wendy Davis Taps Veteran Dem Strategist for Campaign, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 28, 2013, 11:37 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/onpolitics/2013/10/28/wendy-davis-johanson-texas-
governor/3286107/.  
12 Dewey, supra note 4 (“When Texas State Senator Wendy Davis began her 
13-hour filibuster against a Texas anti-abortion bill yesterday, none of the major 
networks w[ere] watching. But thanks to a groundswell of support on social media, 
Davis became not only national news, but also a serious political contender and 
popular meme, shooting into Twitter’s worldwide trends on Tuesday night and 
earning more than half a million mentions on the site.”); Kate Summers-Dawes, Op-
Ed, The Wendy Davis Filibuster: A Win for New Media, MASHABLE (June 27, 
2013), http://mashable.com/2013/06/27/wendy-davis-win-new-media-democracy/ 
(“As the tweets, Facebook posts, and Vine videos rolled in, Tuesday became a huge 
day for new media and, on a larger scale, democracy itself. People were engaged. In 
that moment, they didn't have Rachel Maddow or Bill O'Reilly on 24-hour cable 
news to tell them what they should be up in arms about or how they should think 
about it. They took to the Internet, watching, commenting, and getting their hands 
dirty in the political discourse as history was made, in what otherwise would have 
been a largely ignored issue germane only to one state of many.”).  
13 U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1. 
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation 
for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the 
Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except 
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from 
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective 
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any 
Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in 
any other Place. 
Id. 
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U.S. Supreme Court has not considered the Speech or Debate Clause 
since the 1970s, 14  other than when denying certiorari to cases 
concerning the same.15 However, the addition of social media to the 
legislative process may allow the Court to reconsider the meaning of 
“speech,” as applicable in the Speech or Debate Clause, and the 
availability of immunity to members of Congress when they use 
social media to express opinions about topics related to their 
legislative role.16  
Although Davis did not post any social media messages herself 
while filibustering, this social media campaign raises the question of 
what limitations exist on legislators’ social media usage when on or 
off the house or senate floor.  Since social media, cell phones, and 
constant internet access were concepts certainly not in the minds of 
the drafters of the Constitution, interpreting the Constitution to 
accommodate these societal developments is a necessity. The goal of 
this Comment is to explore how social media usage by legislators 
interacts with the Speech or Debate Clause, the Westfall Act, and the 
First Amendment concepts of legislative immunity and free speech. 
This Comment contemplates whether actions could be brought against 
legislators for their social media speech from fellow legislators and 
the general public for claims including defamation, libel, or related 
torts, such as infliction of emotional distress.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See William M. Howard, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Federal and State Constitutional and Statutory Speech or Debate Provisions, 24 
A.L.R. 6th 255 (2007); see also Charles W. Johnson IV, The Doctrine of Official 
Immunity: An Unnecessary Intrusion into Speech or Debate Clause Jurisprudence, 
43 CATH. U. L. REV. 535, 537 (1994).  
15 E.g., U.S. v. Rayburn H. Off. Bldg., Room 2113, Washington, D.C. 20515, 
497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert denied. 552 U.S. 1295 (2008); U.S. v. Jefferson, 
546 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert denied 556 U.S. 1236 (2009); U.S. v. Renzi, 651 
F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).  
16 U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1.; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 203 
(1880) (“I will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or 
haranguing in debate, but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a 
written report, and to every other act resulting from the nature and in the execution 
of the office.”).   
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This Comment will examine the possible interpretations of the 
Speech or Debate Clause as it applies to the use of social media by 
state legislators and members of Congress. Part I gives background on 
the importance of social media in today’s world, a general overview 
of popular sites, and data on legislators’ use of these platforms.  Part 
II provides a brief history of the Speech or Debate Clause and 
Supreme Court interpretations and applications of its language. Part 
III examines how states have incorporated the federal Speech or 
Debate Clause into their constitutions and applied the privilege to 
state legislators. Part IV introduces the Westfall Act, which greatly 
expands legislative immunity from torts, making the Speech or 
Debate Clause’s limitations much less authoritative. Part V describes 
the relevant First Amendment concepts that are applicable to 
interpreting what constitutes speech in the Internet and social 
networking context. 
Finally, Part VI argues that a legislator’s use of social media 
during the legislative session is akin to unprotected press releases and 
statements to the media, as analyzed using the Speech or Debate 
Clause. However, since the Westfall Act likely grants legislative 
immunity for comments to the media and the First Amendment 
provides for the free flow of communication, most legislators’ social 
messaging and social media actions are not likely actionable.  
This analysis requires the examination of the layers of 
protection for legislators provided by different legal doctrines. The 
Speech or Debate Clause establishes the concept of legislative 
immunity and broadened by the Westfall Act. The First Amendment 
defines speech in the social media context. In the federal sphere, the 
layers of legislative immunity developed by the various concepts 
likely protect most of Congressional members’ social media speech; 
however, lack of Westfall Act protection at the state level potentially 
leaves state legislators exposed to liability.17  
I. SOCIAL MEDIA DEFINITIONS AND USAGE 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See infra Parts III, IV, VI. 
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Social media includes a variety of websites that serve as 
platforms of communication and information sharing.18 One scholar 
gave social media the following description:  
 
Social networking sites provide online communities via a 
web-based service that enables users to interact, connect, 
reconnect, communicate, and collaborate in various 
ways—such as through audio, words, pictures, or video—
with friends, family, acquaintances, professional 
colleagues, and others.19  
 
According to a Pew Research Center study, by May 2013, 72% of 
“online adults” use a social media website, and 40% of cell phone 
users access social media through their phone.20 Pew’s research also 
shows that 39% of all American adults engage in “civic or political 
activities with social media.”21  
These statistics are just one set of data showing the widespread 
usage of social media websites that crosses demographics. Social 
media is likely to continue to grow and be an ever-present aspect of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 E.g., Carolyn Elefant, The “Power” of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best 
Practices for Utilities Engaging Social Media, 32 ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 (2011) (defining 
social media as “a catch phrase that describes technology that facilitates interactive 
information, user-created content and collaboration.” (citation omitted)); Craig 
Estlinbaum, Social Networking and Judicial Ethics, 2 ST. MARY'S J. ON LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 2, 7 (2012) (stating “[t]he terms ‘social media,’ ‘social 
network,’ and ‘social networking’ are used interchangeably in this Essay to refer to 
‘web-based services that allow individuals to: (1) construct a public or semi-public 
profile within a bounded system[;] (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they 
share a connection[;] and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those 
made by others within the system.’” (citation omitted)).  
19 Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the 
Legal Field: Just "Face" It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 358 (2010) (citation omitted). 
20 Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2015).  
21 Lee Rainie, et al., Social Media and Political Engagement, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Oct. 19, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Political-
engagement/Summary-of-Findings.aspx.  
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nearly all American lives.22 This provides a platform through which 
legislator constituents are readily accessible.  
An understanding of how social media websites work is useful 
to examine how politicians and members of the legislature can utilize 
these sources to reach out to their constituents. Facebook is a website 
where people “connect” with other people by becoming online 
“friends” where they can post a “status,” pictures, and video. 
Facebook friends can like, comment, and share other people’s posts 
with their network.23 Facebook self-reports “890 million daily active 
users on average for December 2014”24 and is considered the most 
popular and highly trafficked social networking site.25  
Twitter is another heavily utilized social media site for engaging 
in conversation and spreading information. Unlike Facebook, where 
users generally know the people they connect with, Twitter allows 
users to “follow” virtually anyone with an account.26 Twitter users 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Laura J. Thalacker & Courtney Miller O'Mara, Public Employees and the 
First Amendment: The Intersection of Free Speech Rights and Social Media, NEV. 
LAW., Nov. 2012, at 13 (“Social media has fundamentally changed the way we 
communicate and impacts almost every part of our lives, from personal, to 
professional, to commercial.”); Estlinbaum supra note 18 at 4 (“Historians will 
likely mark the first decade of the twenty-first century as the dawn of the Social 
Media Age. Memberships on social network sites…like Facebook, Twitter, 
Google+, YouTube, and LinkedIn increased exponentially each year since their 
humble beginnings….” (citations omitted)).  
23 See Karen Tanenbaum, Should the Default Be "Social"? Canada's Pushback 
Against Over-Sharing by Facebook, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 275, 280-83 (2011); 
Tal Harari, Facebook Frenzy Around the World: The Different Implications 
Facebook Has on Law Students, Lawyers, and Judges, 19 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
1, 3-5 (2012). 
24 Company Info, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2015).  
25 Lee Rainie, et al., Coming and Going on Facebook, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
(Feb. 5, 2013), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Coming-and-going-on-
facebook.aspx (stating “[t]wo-thirds of online American adults (67%) are Facebook 
users, making Facebook the dominant social networking site in this 
country.”(citation omitted)); Tanenbaum, supra note 23, at 277; Harari, supra note 
23, at 3-5. 
26 While most accounts are public, a Twitter user may set his account as private, 
requiring other users to request access to follow him. See Getting Started with 
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write “tweets” limitd to 140 characters that can include links, images, 
and videos; these tweets can be “retweeted” from one user to another 
user’s Twitter feed.27 The feed displays all of the tweets posted by the 
accounts the user follows and is updated in real time.28 Users can 
include a “hashtag” within their tweet, which is a pound sign followed 
by words; this makes their tweet searchable by the hashtag.29 In 2011, 
Twitter reported over 200 million accounts30 and approximately 140 
million tweets per day.31 Twitter is a popular platform for celebrities 
and public figures to interact with their fans; news sources also 
frequently monitor these figures’ Twitter usage.32  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/50-welcome-to-
twitter/topics/204-the-basics/articles/215585-twitter-101-getting-started-with-twitter 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013); The Twitter Glossary, TWITTER, 
https://support.twitter.com/groups/50-welcome-to-twitter/topics/204-the-
basics/articles/166337-the-twitter-glossary (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); Sarah Joseph, 
Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights, 35 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 
145, 148 (2012). 
27 Getting Started with Twitter, supra note 26. 
28 Id. 
29 Using Hashtags on Twitter, TWITTER, 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/49309-what-are-hashtags-symbols (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2013). 
30 Bianca Bosker, Twitter: We Now Have Over 200 Million Accounts 
(Updated), HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2011, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/28/twitter-number-of-
users_n_855177.html. 
31 Catharine Smith, Twitter User Statistics Show Stunning Growth, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 6:40 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/14/twitter-user-statistics_n_835581.html. 
32 See, e.g., Alicia Adejobi, Best Celebrity Twitter and Instagram Posts of the 
Week: Chris Brown, Madonna, Zoella and Alfie, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2015, 
11:51 AM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/best-celebrity-twitter-instagram-posts-week-
chris-brown-madonna-zoella-alfie-1496937; Kristin Harris, The 10 Most Popular 
Celebrities on Twitter in 2014, BUZZFEED, (Dec. 10, 2014, 1:50 PM) 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/kristinharris/the-most-popular-celebrities-on-twitter-in-
2014#.lxRjzmV6B;  Katy Steinmetz, Main Tweet: Researchers Dig Into The 
Intersection of Politics and Twitter, TIME (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/14/main-tweet-researchers-dig-into-the-
intersection-of-politics-and-twitter/; Sean Sullivan, What Twitter Has Meant for 
Politics (and What it Hasn’t), WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2013), 
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According to Twitter, there are 155 members of Congress with 
official Twitter accounts as of early 2015.33 However, a study by the 
Congressional Research Service found that 78.7% of members of 
Congress have official Twitter accounts and 87.2% have Facebook 
accounts.34 Facebook created an official “best practices” guide for 
new members of the 113th Congress on how to create official pages, 
follow other members of Congress,35 target followers with advertising 
based on zip codes,36 and “explain the votes you take.”37  
Members of Congress typically use their official Twitter pages 
to post about legislation they do or do not support, describe actions 
they are taking in Congress, mention meetings or appearances they 
are attending, and disclose personal information.38 The Congressional 
Research Service study ranked the most popular ways members of 
Congress use social media, finding that expressing a “position on a 
policy or political issue” is most common, followed by comments 
about their district or state, and then messages that “described or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/21/what-twitter-has-
meant-for-politics-and-what-it-hasnt/; Matthew Jacobs, Obama’s Twitter Followers 
Outnumbered By Four Celebrities, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2013, 1:50 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/obama-twitter-
followers_n_2923612.html; Kelly Phillips Erb, When Politics and Hollywood 
Intersect: Actress Tweets Tax Policy Among Criticism , FORBES (Sept. 10, 2012, 
10:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012/09/10/when-politics-
and-hollywood-intersect-actress-tweets-tax-policy-among-criticism/. 
33 US Congress: A Public List by Verified Accounts, TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/verified/us-congress/members (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
34 MATTHEW ERIC GLASSMAN ET AL., SOCIAL NETWORKING AND CONSTITUENT 
COMMUNICATIONS: MEMBERS’ USE OF TWITTER AND FACEBOOK DURING A TWO-
MONTH PERIOD OF THE 112TH CONGRESS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 5 (Mar. 22, 
2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43018.pdf. 
35 FACEBOOK WASHINGTON DC, FACEBOOK GUIDE FOR THE 113TH CONGRESS 
(Nov. 29, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/114953498/facebook-
guide-for-the-113th-congress (“Subscribe to the ‘U.S. House’ interest list to keep 
tabs on what other offices are posting to Facebook”).  
36  Id. (“Buy ads to promote your page. You can target the zip codes in your 
district to reach just your constituents”).  
37 Id. (showing examples of how a member of Congress posted statuses about 
his position on a bill.).  
38 GLASSMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 4. 
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recounted an official or congressional action.”39 Over a two-month 
period in 2011, members of Congress tweeted 30,765 times and 
posted to Facebook 16,239 times.40 It is likely that this number has 
increased over the past two years.41 The Congressional Research 
Services study highlights the value that legislators place on using 
social media to communicate with their constituents.42  
Just as the speechwriter is in the arsenal of nearly every 
politician, many legislators have hired specialists to handle their 
social media accounts.43 In a study by the Congressional Management 
Foundation, 59% of congressional staffers are of the opinion that 
“social media is worth the time their offices spend on it,” and 55% 
believe there are “more benefits than risks” involved with using social 
media.44 Of those staffers surveyed, thirty identified themselves as 
“social media managers,” responsible for the office’s “social media 
practices.”45 This group consists of “communications directors, press 
secretaries or new media directors.”46 Overall, staffers, especially 
Democratic staffers, believe more time should be devoted to 
connecting with constituents via social media, especially increasing 
the number of videos posted and adding content to official blogs.47 
With the emphasis legislators have placed on using social media 
for the good it can do in spreading their message, there is also a large 
potential for a legislator or staff member to make an error when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Id. at 8-11. 
40 Id. at 6. 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 CONGRESSIONAL MANAGEMENT FOUNDATION, #SOCIALCONGRESS: 
PERCEPTIONS AND USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON CAPITOL HILL 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.congressfoundation.org/storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/cmf-social-
congress.pdf. 
44 Id. at 4. 
45 Id. at 2, 10. 
46 Id. at 10.  
47 Id. at 12. Merriam-Webster defines “blog” as “a Web site that contains online 
personal reflections, comments, and often hyperlinks provided by the writer.” Blog, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/blog (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2015). 
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posting to social media. Consequently, the legislative privilege is an 
area of law that needs to be reexamined for the modern social media 
era.  
II. HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SPEECH OR DEBATE 
CLAUSE 
The development of the Speech or Debate Clause and the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of it are highly instructive of the 
purpose and limits of the legislative privilege.  
The origins of the Speech or Debate Clause are traced to the 
English Parliament’s need for freedom from the monarchy as a 
sovereign law-making body.48 The Speech or Debate Clause is found 
in Article One, Section Six, Clause One, and reads,  
The Senators and Representatives shall….be privileged 
from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of 
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning 
from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either 
House, they shall not be questioned in any other 
Place.49 
In 1880, the Supreme Court first considered the meaning and 
protections of the Speech or Debate Clause in Kilbourn v. 
Thompson. 50  The defendants, several members of the House of 
Representatives including the Speaker of the House, were charged 
with falsely imprisoning a citizen that was part of a bankruptcy 
investigation regarding a U.S. government contract. 51  The Court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1966) (“The language of 
that Article, of which the present clause is only a slight modification, is in turn 
almost identical to the English Bill of Rights of 1689:  ‘That the Freedom of 
Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.’”); Johnson IV, supra note 14, 
at 539. 
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
50 103 U.S. at 168. 
51 Id. at 173-174.  
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found that the defendants did not have the power to arrest citizens, but 
the Speech or Debate Clause provided the House members immunity 
because ordering the arrest was a legislative act.52 The Court stated 
that the immunity privilege of speech or debate extends to legislative 
actions “generally done in a session of the House by one of its 
members in relation to the business before it.”53  
In choosing a broad interpretation of the legislative privilege,54 
the Court relied on the historical development of a need for the 
legislative body to be able to make and execute laws, a duty “which 
the Constitution has conferred on them.” 55  The Kilbourn Court 
determined the “reason of the rule” applied as much to “words spoken 
in debate” as to writings, reports, resolutions, reproductions of 
speeches, and votes.56  
 The broad interpretation of the legislative privileges continued 
when the Court next considered the legislative privilege in the 1951 
case Tenney v. Brandhove.57 At issue were defamatory comments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
52 Id. at 204-05.  
53 Id. at 204. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 183.  
The advocates of this power have, therefore, resorted to an 
implication of its existence, founded on two principal arguments. 
These are, 1, its exercise by the House of Commons of England, 
from which country we, it is said, have derived our system of 
parliamentary law; and, 2d, the necessity of such a power to 
enable the two Houses of Congress to perform the duties and 
exercise the powers which the Constitution has conferred on 
them.  
Id. at 183-84. (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 7 (1808), which interpreted the 
Constitution of Massachusetts that included the language “‘The freedom of 
deliberation, speech, and debate in either House of the legislature is so essential to 
the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or 
prosecution, action, or complaint, in any other Court or place whatsoever.’”). 
56 Id. at 204. 
57 341 U.S. 367, 367 (1951).  
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during a hearing of the California Legislative Tenney Committee.58 
The plaintiff argued that the hearing was meant to “intimidate and 
silence the plaintiff, and prevent him from effectively exercising his 
constitutional rights of free speech.”59  The Court found that the 
legislators “were acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity” 
in holding hearings and including information about the plaintiff in 
discussions and the record.60 In holding so, the Court noted that “an 
unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege” because the 
reasoning for the privilege is to allow legislators to speak openly 
when making legislation.61   
United States v. Johnson was the first Supreme Court case to 
consider the applicability of the Speech or Debate Clause in a 
criminal matter.62 The Court’s analysis concluded that inquiries as to 
whether former Congressman Thomas F. Johnson wrote a speech 
himself and inquiries into the motives behind the speech, allegedly a 
bribe, were impermissible under the Speech or Debate Clause.63 
Inquiries into the motives of a Member of Congress’s speech was 
“precisely what the Speech or Debate Clause generally forecloses 
from executive and judicial inquiry.”64 The Court stated it was not 
foreclosing the possibility of a “narrowly drawn statute” that would 
allow Congress “to regulate the conduct of its members.”65 Johnson 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Id. at 370-71.  
59 Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
60 Id. at 375-76. 
61 Id. at 377.  
Freedom of speech and action in the legislature was taken as a 
matter of course by those who severed the Colonies from the 
Crown and founded our Nation. It was deemed so essential for 
representatives of the people that it was written into the Articles 
of Confederation and later into the Constitution. 
Id. at 372. 
62 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966). 
63 Id. at 173-77.  
64 Id. at 180. 
65 Id. at 185.  
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indicates that the Supreme Court could narrow Congressional 
immunity,66 but if this were to happen, Johnson indicates that it would 
be limited to a criminal context. 
The Supreme Court changed course in United States v. Brewster 
by further defining that the immunity provided by the Speech or 
Debate Clause is limited to “legislative activity” that is not “political 
in nature.”67 Unprotected political activity, according to the Court, 
includes communications with constituents, such as “news releases, 
and speeches.”68 The Court reached this conclusion by stating that 
these “legitimate ‘errands’” are part of a Congress Member’s actions 
as a legislator,69 but are not activities normally engaged in during “the 
process of enacting legislation,”70 the only activity that the Court has 
previously intended the Speech or Debate Clause to protect.71 The 
Court noted the purpose of legislative immunities is not for the 
“personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect 
the integrity of the legislative process,”72 which allows legislators to 
act egregiously,73 but only when related to activities that are integral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Id.; United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 510 (1972) (noting the “narrow 
scope” of the Johnson Court’s holding).  
67 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512.  
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 514. 
71 Id. at 512-15. Clarifying, the Court stated,  
Emphasis is placed on the statement that ‘there are cases in which 
(a Member) is entitled to this privilege, when not within the walls 
of the representatives' chamber.’ But the context of Coffin v. 
Coffin indicates that in this passage Chief Justice Parsons was 
referring only to legislative acts, such as committee meetings, 
which take place outside the physical confines of the legislative 
chamber. 
Id. at 514-15. 
72 Id. at 507.  
73 Id. at 516-17. 
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to the legislative process, such as committee meetings and floor 
speeches.74  
 The Supreme Court reiterated that “legislative acts are not all 
encompassing” in Gravel v. United States, 75  issued in the same 
session as Brewster. In Gravel, the Court extended legislative 
immunity to legislative aides.76 Senator Gravel’s aide was subpoenaed 
by a federal grand jury to testify about the efforts by Senator Gravel 
and the aide to publish highly secretive reports about actions in 
Vietnam, known as the Pentagon Papers.77 The Court found that 
legislative aides are effectively the “alter egos” of Members of 
Congress because of “the complexities of the modern legislative 
process,” which requires nearly constant attention to “matters of 
legislative concern.”78 However, legislative immunity did not protect 
Senator Gravel or his aide from answering questions posed by a 
federal grand jury. Privately publishing the government study was “in 
no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate,” so Senator Gravel 
and his aide were not protected and questioning related to this issue 
did not violate their Speech or Debate Clause rights.79 
Justice Douglas dissented in the opinion, arguing that Senator 
Gravel’s introduction of the Pentagon Papers into the record 
inherently made them public.80 Additionally, Justice Douglas argued 
publishing the Pentagon Papers with a private publishing house falls 
within the informative function and duty of Members of Congress.81 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Id. (“In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all 
conduct relating to the legislative process. In every case thus for before this Court, 
the Speech or Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was clearly a part of 
the legislative process-the due functioning of the process.”). 
75 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). 
76 Id. at 616 (“We agree with the Court of Appeals that for the purpose of 
construing the privilege a Member and his aide are to be ‘treated as one.’” (internal 
citation omitted)).  
77 Id. at 608-09.  
78 Id. at 616-17. 
79 Id. at 625-26.  
80 Id. at 633-36 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
81 Id.  
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Justice Douglas argues that educating and informing the public about 
legislative and executive actions through congressional records and 
exhibits is a core “philosophy” of the Speech or Debate Clause.82 A 
second dissent, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices 
Douglas and Marshall, argued that the majority opinion would 
“endanger the continued performance of legislative tasks that are 
vital” by preventing legislators from providing information to a 
“wider audience,” which is an essential legislative activity.83  
Doe v. McMillan84 further defined the breadth of the Speech or 
Debate Clause by protecting Members of Congress and Congressional 
Committees from a libel action brought by parents of school children 
from an underperforming school.85 The parents brought the action 
after information about the children’s academic performance was 
used as evidence in committee reports, which the committee planned 
to disseminate to the public.86 The Court found the committee’s 
actions are clearly protected by the Speech or Debate Clause as 
“legislative acts.”87 The Court clarified that if a member of Congress 
republished the libelous information themselves, the legislator could 
be found liable for violating federal and state libel laws because 
publishing the information in a situation not related to a legislative act 
is not covered by the official immunity doctrine.88 
A few years later, the Court considered another case involving a 
libel charge in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,89 in which Senator Proxmire 
sent a press release to members of the media containing remarks he 
was making to the Senate awarding Hutchinson, a scientist, with the 
“Golden Fleece of the Month Award” for “wasteful government 
spending.”90  Senator Proxmire began giving out the Golden Fleece of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Id. at 636. 
83 Id. at 648-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
84 412 U.S. 306 (1973). 
85 Id. at 308-09.  
86 Id. at 309, 312-13. 
87 Id. at 312. (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 618). 
88 Id. at 315-19.  
89 443 U.S. 111 (1979).  
90 Id. at 114. 
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the Month Award in March 1975 to expose what be believed was the 
biggest waste of government funding. 91  Referencing similar 
arguments made in the Gravel dissents92 and by Senator Proxmire,93 
the Court defined the “informing function” of the legislature to 
exclude Members of Congress from having the duty to inform their 
constituents or the public about legislative action.94 Rather, legislators 
inform themselves of executive branch actions through committee 
hearings.95 Applying this interpretation, the Court made clear that 
press releases are not protected under the Speech or Debate Clause, 
thereby committing to a narrow interpretation of protected 
communications and publications deemed necessary for legislative 
decision-making.96  
III. STATE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSES 
 The federal Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause only 
applies to Members of Congress 97  and many perceive it as 
indispensable to the legislative branch’s independence. Legislative 
independence has been an integral part of the United States’ 
democratic system since the country’s founding,98 and many states 
incorporated variations of the constitutional clause into their state 
constitutions to preserve the separation of powers.99 As noted in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Id.  
92 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 633-49 (1972) (Douglas, J., and 
Brennan, J., dissenting).  
93 Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 132.  
94 Id. at 132-33. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 133 (“Valuable and desirable as it may be in broad terms, the 
transmittal of such information by individual Members in order to inform the public 
and other Members is not a part of the legislative function or the deliberations that 
make up the legislative process. As a result, transmittal of such information by press 
releases and newsletters is not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.”).  
97 United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 374 (1980) (“The Federal Speech or 
Debate Clause, of course, is a limitation on the Federal Executive, but by its terms is 
confined to federal legislators.”). 
98 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202 (1880) 
99 Id. 
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Kilbourn, the intent of the federal Speech or Debate Clause was 
actually drawn from language used in Massachusetts where the 
drafters adopted wording for their clause almost directly from English 
Parliament protections.100   
Most states incorporate a version of the Speech or Debate 
Clause that provides similar immunities to their state legislators as the 
immunities provided by the federal Speech or Debate Clause.101  
However, the states have adopted language with some variations 
to the federal version.102 Although most of the clauses read the same 
as the federal constitutional language,103 there are some states that use 
“deliberation, speech or debate.”104 Other states use “for words spoken 
or used in debate.”105 Some states use the slightly narrower “liable to 
answer” for any speech or debate, written or oral.106 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Id. at 202-03.  
101 Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 
732 (1980) (“We have also recognized that state legislators enjoy common-law 
immunity from liability for their legislative acts, an immunity that is similar in 
origin and rationale to that accorded Congressmen under the Speech or Debate 
Clause.”); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 375 (1951). There are seven states 
without Speech or Debate Clauses: California, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina. Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the 
Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 237 n.54 
(2003) (discussing the various forms of legislative privilege, and that most states 
without Speech or Debate Clause’s recognize a “common-law privilege of free 
legislative debate.”); see also Gary L. Starkman, State Legislators, Speech or 
Debate, and the Search for Truth, 11 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 69, 69 (1979). 
102 Huefner, supra note 101, at 236-39.  
103 Id. at 236; accord Ala. Const. art. IV, § 56; Ark. Const. art. V, § 15; Colo. 
Const. art. V, § 16; Conn. Const. art. 3, § 15; Del. Const. art. II, § 13; Ind. Const. 
art. 4, § 8; Kan. Const. art. 2, § 22; Ky. Const. § 43; La. Const. art. 3, § 8; Mich. 
Const. art. IV, § 11; Minn. Const. art. IV, § 10; Mo. Const. art. III, § 19; Mont. 
Const. art. V, § 8; N.J. Const. art. IV, § IV, para. 9; N.M. Const. art. IV, § 13; N.Y. 
Const. art. III, § 11; Ohio Const. art. II, § 12; Okla. Const. art. V, § 22; Pa. Const. 
art. II, § 15; R.I. Const. art. VI, § 5; Tenn. Const. art. II, § 13; Va. Const. art. IV, § 
9; Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 16. 
104 Huefner, supra note 101, at 236; accord Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XXI; N.H. 
Const. pt. 1, art. 30; Vt. Const. ch. I, art. XIV.  
105 Huefner, supra note 101, at 236-37; accord Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 
7; Idaho Const. art. III, § 7; Md. Const. art. III § 18; Md. Const. of 1867, 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2015 	  
	   409 
Similar to the relatively few cases regarding the Speech or 
Debate Clause considered by the U.S. Supreme Court, there is a 
similar lack of state jurisprudence considering the interpretation of 
Speech or Debate Clauses.107 There is also a general lack of legal 
scholarship providing a thorough analysis of these state clauses.108 
However, despite the slightly different language that the minority of 
states adopted, the general scholarship and relative lack of 
jurisprudence on the subject matter seem to form a consensus that 
most state constitutional speech or debate clauses are proxies for the 
federal Clause.109  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Declaration of Rights, art. X; Neb. Const. art. III, § 26; N.D. Const. art. IV, § 
15; Or. Const. art. IV, § 9; S.D. Const. art. III, § 11; Tex. Const. art. III, § 21; Utah 
Const. art. VI, § 8; Wash. Const. art. II, § 17; W. Va. Const. art. VI, § 17; Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 16.  
106 Huefner supra note 101, at 237; accord Ga. Const. art. III, § IV, para. IX; Ill. 
Const. art. IV, § 12; Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 8; Alaska Const. art. II, § 6; Haw. 
Const. art. III, § 7. 
107 Huefner supra note 101, at 225 (“By contrast, judicial interpretations of the 
legislative privilege at the state level have been infrequent to date, and in almost 
every state the jurisprudence remains unsettled.”). Contra State ex rel. Stephan v. 
Kansas H. of Reps., 687 P.2d 622, 631 (Kan. 1984) (determining the viability of a 
state legislator using the state’s Speech or Debate clause as a defense); Oates v. 
Marino, 106 A.D.2d 289, 290 (1984) (citing to U.S. Supreme Court cases to support 
argument that New York senator’s allegedly defamatory comments were immune 
from suit). 
108 There are only a handful of legal works available that comment on the topic, 
most of which do not provide an in-depth comparative analysis of state 
constitutional clauses. See Robert Drean, Modern Kansas Legislative Strategies: 
The Blackmail Gambit, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 157 (1995); Natalie A. Finkelman, Note, 
Evidence and Constitutional Law—Evidentiary Privileges for State Legislators—in 
Re Granite Purchases for State Capital, 821 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1987) Cert. Denied, 
108 S. Ct. 749 (1988), 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1015 (1988); Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey 
A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1113 (1973); Starkman, supra note 98, at 69. But see Huefner, supra note 101, 
at 236-39. 
109 E.g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 
719, 733 (1980) (“We generally have equated the legislative immunity to which 
state legislators are entitled under § 1983 to that accorded Congressmen under the 
Constitution.”); Star Distrib., Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1980) (“We 
therefore conclude that state legislators, to the same extent as their federal 
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For the purposes of this Comment, the analysis will utilize the 
acceptance that the majority of state speech or debate clauses are 
interpreted in the same manner as the federal Speech or Debate 
Clause. There are, however, two notable exceptions in which states 
have broadened the scope of the legislative privilege with regard to 
comments to the media that may be of interest in the discussion of 
social media. In a 1956 Oklahoma case,110 the Oklahoma court fully 
protected allegedly defamatory statements a state senator made in a 
floor speech that were printed in a press release111 as “publications or 
communications made in any legislative proceeding.”112  
The Hawaii Supreme Court 113  also extended legislative 
immunity to a senator charged with slander when a reporter 
interviewed him in his office after delivering a speech on the Senate 
floor.114 The Court found that the remarks, naming members of the 
University of Hawaii faculty that he believed were apathetic towards 
education, 115  were of “a subject matter that was of legitimate 
legislative concern” because they clarified the statements made in the 
legislative session.116 Distinctly different from U.S. Supreme Court 
analysis, 117  the Hawaii Supreme Court stated the remarks were 
protected because the statement “not only fulfills his duty to keep the 
public informed, but serves the public interest.”118  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
counterparts, are immune from suit under s 1983 for injunctive relief as well as 
damages based on their activities within the traditional sphere of legislative 
activity.”); Youngblood v. DeWeese, 352 F.3d 836, 839 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The scope 
of state legislators' immunity is ‘coterminous’ with the absolute immunity afforded 
to members of Congress under the Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I, § 6, of the 
United States Constitution.” (internal citations omitted)). 
110 State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Nix, 295 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1956).  
111 Id. at 288-91. 
112 Id. at 291. 
113 Abercrombie v. McClung, 525 P.2d 594 (Haw. 1974). 
114 Id. at 594-96. 
115 Id. at 594. 
116 Id.  
117 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
118 Abercrombie, 525 P.2d at 600. 
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It is notable that the Oklahoma and Hawaii Court decisions 
came before the Supreme Court decided Hutchinson, which reached 
the opposite conclusion regarding press releases. 119  Nevertheless, 
these cases pose interesting lines of analysis that other states may 
employ when considering social media speech by state legislators.  
IV. WESTFALL ACT: MAKING FEDERAL SPEECH OR DEBATE IMMUNITY 
RESTRICTIONS IRRELEVANT? 
 In addition to the Speech or Debate Clause, members of 
Congress receive immunity from tort claims, including defamation, 
under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort 
Compensation Act of 1988.120 Congress enacted the law after the 
Supreme Court refused to extend absolute immunity to a federal 
employee charged with a state-law tort in Westfall v. Erwin.121 The 
Westfall Act, as it is commonly known, 122  now provides that 
employees, including legislators, “acting within the scope of his office 
or employment” are immune from suit, and the action becomes one 
against the United States.123 The scope of the Westfall Act overlaps 
with and goes beyond immunity protection provided to Members of 
Congress from the Speech or Debate Clause, as Courts have 
interpreted it. Although the “acting within the scope” language124 is 
somewhat similar to the “legislative act” standard used by the 
Supreme Court for granting Speech or Debate privilege,125 Courts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 111-15.  
120 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2012).  
121 484 U.S. 292, 300 (1988) (“We are also of the view, however, that Congress 
is in the best position to provide guidance for the complex and often highly 
empirical inquiry into whether absolute immunity is warranted in a particular 
context. Legislated standards governing the immunity of federal employees 
involved in state-law tort actions would be useful.”). 
122 Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 419 (1995).  
123 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).  
124 Id.  
125 See supra Part II.  
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have interpreted “scope of employment” broadly126 to encompass 
actions that would otherwise not be protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause.127 Overall, the Act gives expanded privileges to Members of 
Congress compared to the general citizen by protecting Members of 
Congress from most tort actions.  
 Two U.S. Court of Appeals cases from the District of 
Columbia Circuit interpreting the Westfall Act are pertinent to the 
discussion of social media postings by legislators.128 In both cases, the 
Court found that the Westfall Act protected possibly defamatory 
statements made to reporters and published because the Congressmen 
were acting in the scope of their duties as legislators.129 In Council of 
American Islamic Relations (CAIR) v. Ballenger, U.S. Representative 
Ballenger’s statement that CAIR was a fund-raising arm of terrorist 
group Hezbollah to a reporter in an interview about his recent divorce 
from his wife130 was protected because there was a “clear nexus” 
between his performance as a legislator and his personal life.131 To 
determine the scope of his employment, the Court determined if the 
actions were similar general nature as that authorized or secondary to 
the work authorized.132 Another factor considered is if the purpose is 
to “serve the master.”133 These are factors taken from the Restatement 
of Agency Law.134 Because Representative Ballenger’s comments 
were made during “regular work hours in response to a reporter’s 
inquiry” the Circuit Court found the comments to be within the scope 
of the congressman’s duties and, thusly, protected the comments.135  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 435-37 (1995); Osborn v. Haley, 549 
U.S. 225, 238-53 (2007); Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 
Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
127 See supra notes 84-88 and accompany text (discussing coverage of 
statements to the media). 
128 See Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 377-78; Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 661-62.  
129 Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 377-79; Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 661. 
130 Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 662. 
131 Id. at 665-66. 
132 Id. at 664. 
133 Id. at 665. 
134 Id. at 663-66. 
135 Id. at 664. 
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The same Court considered a similar case a few years later in 
Wuterich v. Murtha, when a U.S. Marine sued a Congressman for 
statements made to various national reporters. 136  Congressman 
Murtha’s remarks allegedly gave the impression that Staff Sergeant 
Wuterich murdered innocent Iraqi civilians in a comparison to war 
crimes committed at Mai Lai during the Vietnam War.137 Wuterich 
argues these comments were made “based on inaccurate information” 
from congressional briefings about the event.138 
 Following the Ballenger analysis,139 the Court decided Westfall 
Act protections were appropriate for Congressman Murtha because 
they were made in his congressional district and were “not campaign 
related” or serving a personal interest.140 Instead the comments were 
“unquestionably” the type of remarks expected to be made by the 
Congressman given that he was “the Ranking Member of the 
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense and had 
introduced legislation to withdraw American troops from Iraq.”141  
These cases serve as an interesting examination of the split 
between the Speech or Debate Clause and the Westfall Act. The 
Westfall Act’s expanded legislative immunity, which differs from the 
Speech or Debate Clause interpretation of what falls within the 
legislator’s official capacity, thus deserving protection, could cause 
tension in the social media context.  
The standards established in Ballenger and Wuterich,142 as to 
what falls within the scope of legislative activity, provide a rather 
broad grant of immunity under the Westfall Act compared to the 
Speech or Debate Clause. In the Speech or Debate context, 
“legislative activity” does not include press releases,143 whereas the 
Westfall interpretation of scope includes an interview with a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 377-78 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
137 Id. at 378-79. 
138 Id. at 378. 
139 Id. at 381. 
140 Id. at 379. 
141 Id. at 384-85. 
142 See supra notes 128-141 and accompanying text.   
143 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 132 (1979). 
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journalist.144 Arguably, there is no meaningful distinction between a 
press release and an interview with a journalist in this context since 
they both serve the similar purpose of communicating with the public. 
The difference in how the Speech or Debate Clause and Westfall Act 
cover communications with the public shows the dichotomy between 
the two: the Westfall Act largely covers areas of activity the Speech 
or Debate Clause does not provide immunity for. Hence, this 
Comment contemplates the Westfall Act provides legislative privilege 
for most causes of actions in a social media context, such as the torts 
of defamation or infliction of emotional distress. 
V. INTERNET SPEECH: ANALYSIS OF HOW FREE SPEECH CONCERNS 
HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED IN REGARD TO SOCIAL NETWORKING 
The Supreme Court has considered a number of cases of 
defamation under the First Amendment that legislators have tried to 
defend, both successfully and unsuccessfully, using the Speech or 
Debate Clause.145 The Speech or Debate Clause does not deal directly 
with the First Amendment free speech doctrine, 146  but an 
understanding of how Internet communication is regulated and 
interpreted by the courts informs the discussion of how legislators’ 
online speech may be interpreted. 
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union is the first case to 
consider free speech as it pertains to the Internet. 147  The Court 
considered censorship of indecent material online from minors under 
the Communications Decency Act.148 The Court compared electronic 
communication, such as e-mails, listservs, and chatrooms, to “a note 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 See Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 664 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006). 
145 See infra text accompanying notes 153-160; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 67-74.  
146 “Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
147 521 U.S. 844 (1997).   
148 Id. at 844. 
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or letter.”149 Throughout the analysis, the Court compared the Internet 
obscenity statutes in the Communications Decency Act to obscenity 
rulings in traditional media, like broadcasting, distribution of 
pornographic materials, and a zoning ordinance.150 Despite the Court’s 
comparison of online communication to traditional media, the Court 
noted that the Internet is not “subject to the type of government 
supervision and regulation” needed for other communication 
platforms because Internet users easily control the information they 
access online based on what they search and look at, which is unique 
from telecommunications and print media.151  
An issue of importance in analyzing online speech that the 
Supreme Court has not yet considered is the usage of actions that do 
not involve actual messages, such as liking and sharing on Facebook, 
and re-tweeting a tweet on Twitter.152 The Fourth Circuit recently 
considered whether a Facebook “like” constitutes speech 153  and 
protected the action as both “pure speech” and “symbolic expression” 
under the First Amendment.154 The case considered whether Sheriff 
Office employees could be fired in retaliation for liking the Facebook 
campaign page for the opposing Sheriff in an election,155 which 
caused a comment to appear on the employees’ Facebook pages 
showing the Facebook like.156 The court applied the First Amendment 
balancing test for public employees, balancing the need for efficient 
government operations with the rights of public employees to enjoy 
free speech as private citizens.157 Finding that the employees were 
acting in their private capacity,158 the court concluded liking the page 
and the subsequent “statement” on the user’s Facebook profile 
comprised a “substantive statement” that amounted to the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Id. at 851-52.  
150 Id. at 864-68. 
151 Id. at 868-69. 
152 See supra Part I. 
153 Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 380 (4th Cir. 2013). 
154 Id. at 386.  
155 Id. at 372-73, 384-85. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. at 373-74. 
158 Id. at 387. 
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“constitutional significance” as actually writing out the statement of 
support.159 Additionally, the like is protected as symbolic speech 
because the thumbs-up symbol displayed is the equivalent of 
“displaying a political sign in one’s front yard.”160  
Another aspect of Internet communication that could play a role 
in legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause is service 
provider liability for publishing legislators’ social media speech.161  
Section 230(c)(1) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 states: 
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”162 The Fifth Circuit interpreted 
this language to mean service providers can choose to “publish, 
withdraw, postpone or alter content.” 163  Following Congress’s 
intention to prevent tort claims such as defamation and to protect the 
generally unregulated nature of Internet communications, the Fifth 
Circuit has interpreted these terms broadly.164 In the Speech or Debate 
Clause context, allowing claims only against the legislator who 
engaged in the speech disincentives service providers from censoring 
content on websites such as Facebook and Twitter.165   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Id. at 386. 
160 Id. 
161 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. 
162 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998).  
163 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
164 Id. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (stating “the policy of the United States 
[is]…to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for 
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.”); Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in A Digital Age, 36 
PEPP. L. REV. 427, 433 (2009) (“In other words, people who deliver Internet traffic, 
like broadband companies, cannot be held liable for the traffic that flows through 
their networks. Even more important, people who operate websites or online 
services on which other people provide content, like chat rooms, blogging services, 
website hosting services, search engines, bulletin boards, or social networking sites 
like Facebook and MySpace, cannot be held liable for what other people say when 
others use these networks, services, or sites.”).  
165 See supra Part II. 
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VI. LEGISLATORS’ SOCIAL MEDIA SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE 
RESTRICTIONS 
 In the few years since social media has been integrated into 
American culture by the daily use of social messaging platforms, 
lower courts have generally hesitated to regulate the free flow of 
communication.166 One important exception is the Supreme Court, 
which has taken small steps to limit complete immunity for members 
of Congress by establishing a standard that only protects legislators 
for legislative acts.167 On the other hand, the additional protections of 
the Westfall Act for federal actors provides a layer of protection to 
enable legislators to communicate with their constituents without 
constant fear of tort litigation for possibly defamatory comments.168 
There are legislators who utilize modern technologies to provide 
constituents with continuous updates regarding their official duties, 
but there is also a concern that their communication is designed for 
political gain rather than a legislative purpose.  
Legislators may frequently find themselves in a gray area:  the 
legislators’ social media postings are comments or explanations about 
actions taken during the legislative session, but the underlying 
reasoning for the post is to promote their stance in a campaign or 
attack a political opponent. If the content of the post is interpreted as 
directly related to legislative activity, then the “unworthy purpose” of 
the message cannot be questioned per Tenney v. Brandhove and 
United States v. Johnson.169 The Speech or Debate Clause protection, 
therefore, may include postings with an inherently political purpose 
so long as they, even tangentially, relate to a legitimate legislative 
purpose. The cases interpreting the Westfall Act imply that politically 
motivated speech, including campaign speech, will normally be 
deemed within the scope of the employment of the federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 See supra Part I.  
167 See supra Part II. 
168 See supra Part IV. 
169 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951); accord United States v. 
Johnson 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966).  
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legislator.170 Therefore, in most cases there is likely protection for 
online speech loosely related to lawmaking, even if it is ostensibly 
said for a non-lawmaking purpose.  
 Although there are only a handful of Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause, it seems apparent that the 
modern Court leans towards limiting protection under the Speech or 
Debate Clause. Limitations include: (1) speech not made in a 
legislative session or in actions directly related to enacting legislation, 
such as in committee sessions; (2) debate over a bill and language 
included in the Congressional Record; and (3) lack of protection for 
comments made to reporters.171  
Given these limitations, it seems the Court may take a restrictive 
approach to granting members of Congress immunity from 
defamation or other torts in a social media context. If the post relates 
directly to the motivations behind proposed legislation, however, 
including a vote or a speech delivered on the floor of Congress, the 
precedent of Kilbourn and Johnson may require that these comments 
be protected because the Court explicitly protected inquiries into 
legislators’ motivations for legislative acts.172 On the other hand, 
under McMillan and Hutchinson, if the legislator is posting 
information unrelated to an official legislative act, the Court likely 
will qualify it as an unprivileged legislative errand.173  
Arguably, the main function of social media is providing 
information. The Supreme Court explicitly did not recognize 
informing constituents as a legitimate legislative act covered by the 
Speech or Debate Clause.174 It seems to follow that social media will 
be lumped into the category of the press release as part of the 
unofficial informing function of the legislative office that is not 
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.175 In the social media 
context, updating the public on statements made in debate or the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 See supra Part IV. 
171 See supra Part II. 
172 See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text. 
174 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 132-33 (1979). 
175 Id.  
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legislator’s support for a bill that is up for vote could be interpreted as 
simply informing the public, or it could be directly related to the 
legislator’s duty of enacting legislation that benefits their 
constituents.176 Consequently, it appears that protection for social 
media postings could fall on either side of the protected line 
depending on how liberally legislative act is interpreted in modern 
Courts.  
 Additionally, Speech or Debate Clause immunity for 
legislators’ social media postings could vary depending on who is 
actually making the posts. As discussed earlier, under Gravel, 
immunity was extended to legislative aides that were essentially the 
alter ego of the legislator. 177  In a study by the Congressional 
Management Foundation about the impact of social media and online 
communication, including e-mail and social network sites, a survey of 
Congressional staff revealed that “three-quarters” of Washington, 
D.C. staffers are involved in “managing constituent communications” 
in some capacity. 178  The study found that although some 
Congressional offices are hiring new staff to focus on electronic 
communications, most are spreading out these duties to current 
staffers.179 Who is posting tweets and Facebook statuses for legislators 
is unclear to the constituent and varies by office,180 complicating the 
matter of when staffers, a dedicated social media coordinator, or the 
legislator are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause immunity. If 
the legislator posted the communication himself or herself, and falls 
within a “legislative act,” then immunity is applied easily.181  
However, would a social media coordinator, communications 
deputy, or press relations staffer fall under the category of “alter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Id.  
177 Gravel v. U.S., 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972). 
178 CONGRESSIONAL MANAGEMENT FOUNDATION, COMMUNICATING WITH 
CONGRESS: HOW CAPITAL HILL IS COPING WITH THE SURGE IN CITIZEN ADVOCACY 
15-16 (2005), available at 
http://www.congressfoundation.org/storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/cwc_capitolhillc
oping.pdf.  
179 Id. at 4.  
180 GLASSMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 12. 
181 See supra Part II. 
Vol. 10.2]   Shelby Sklar 	  
	  420 
ego[]?”182 The Gravel Court extended immunity to legislative aides if 
the actions taken by the aide would be protected if the legislator 
would be immune performing the same act.183 Hence, it would make 
sense that if a staffer manages the legislator’s social media accounts, 
then they should be protected in the same manner as the legislator.  
However, a Court has not considered this type of question, so it 
is highly speculative that the Court would view any type of staffer as 
the alter ego of a legislator when posting online on the legislator’s 
behalf. Based on the interpretation of alter ego provided by the Gravel 
Court, a staffer whose sole or major role is to make social media 
postings for the legislator should be seen as the alter ego deserving 
protection because they are acting as the legislator to the public.184  
But, if the account is framed in a way that makes it clear the 
posts represent the legislator’s office’s views, meaning not coming 
from the legislator’s first person perspective, it could be reasonable to 
make the distinction that the social media staffer is not presenting the 
views, thoughts, or words of the legislator. In most cases it is likely 
that the account is written by a staffer who is presenting the public 
with the legislator’s speech, since a point of social media accounts is 
to make the public feel personally connected with the legislator.  
The Westfall Act likely fills in whatever gaps the Speech or 
Debate Clause leaves open in providing immunity to legislators’ 
social media communication. As the D.C. Circuit Court opinions 
show, the term scope of employment includes comments made to 
newspapers if the information is pertinent to their constituents and 
there is a nexus to their positions as a legislator.185 Given how broadly 
nexus was interpreted in these two cases and the vague discussion of 
nexus by the Supreme Court on the meaning of the term,186 most 
Members of Congress will likely be able to rely on Westfall Act 
protection in order to avoid liability for any defamatory social media 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616-17. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. 
185 See Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 664 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006); Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 384-85 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
186 See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 250 n. 14 (2007). 
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communication. This is bolstered by the First Amendment Internet 
jurisprudence, which, since its advent, has been continually 
championed as a source of freedom of communication and is highly 
regarded by many scholars and legislators,187 including substantial 
utilization in President Obama’s campaigns,188 as an essential new 
tool for democracy.189  
Additionally, the Westfall Act’s inclusion of the informative 
function of the legislator further supports integration of social media 
communication as deserving of the legislative privilege. This 
inclusion is important because social media messaging is currently 
unparalleled in its ability to foster constant and instant communication 
amongst people all around the country and the globe.190  
The Speech or Debate Clause and First Amendment’s interest in 
promoting democratic discussions and broad interpretations for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 See supra Part I. 
188 Sally Katzen, Governing in the Information Age: Technology As A Tool of 
Democratic Engagement, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2285 (2011) (“Whether or not you 
view President Obama as a transformational person, he was the first candidate for 
the presidency to truly exploit technology in furtherance of his campaign. Use of the 
Internet and social media worked for him, and it is clear from the 2010 mid-term 
election campaigns that many on both sides of the aisle took this page from his 
playbook and emulated, or even expanded on, his example.”); William A. Herbert, 
Can't Escape from the Memory: Social Media and Public Sector Labor Law, 40 N. 
KY. L. REV. 427, 428 (2013) (“The successful presidential campaigns of Barack 
Obama can be attributed, in part, to the masterful use of social media and other 




189 See generally Jack M. Balkin, Commentaries: Digital Speech and 
Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression For the Information 
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Muriel Morisey, Fifty Years After the Sit-Ins: 
Events, Trends, and Recommendations, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 82 (2010); Sarah 
Joseph, Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights, 35 B.C. Int'l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 145 (2012); Note, Amir Hatem Ali, The Power of Social Media in 
Developing Nations: New Tools for Closing the Global Digital Divide and Beyond, 
24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185 (2011).  
190 See Ali, supra note 189, at 185-90. 
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legislative duty, combined with the Westfall Act’s protection of the 
informative function, supports a conclusion that the legislative 
privileges originally contemplated extend to social media in much the 
same way as to traditional speech. 
There is one pitfall in relying on the Westfall Act as the source 
of legislative privilege, which is the lack of such a tort immunity act 
in state codes.191 If states continue to follow the federal interpretation 
of the Speech or Debate Clause, then possibly only tweets that are 
defamatory but are based on a clear legislative action will be 
protected, as discussed in the federal context.192 But, since some states 
have already interpreted their state constitutional clauses in different 
ways from the federal Courts,193 as in Hawaii and Oklahoma where 
protection has extended to interviews with the media,194 there is a 
possibility that state courts may stray from federal court interpretation 
in order to facilitate the continued democratic expression and 
openness of government that social media fosters.  
This is where legislators like Wendy Davis could influence the 
way that states, and possibly even the federal Courts, interprets the 
Speech or Debate Clause, or could possibly inspire state legislation 
explicitly extending legislative immunity for state legislators. As 
discussed earlier, Davis sparked a movement because of tweets her 
team sent out before she filibustered on the Texas Senate Floor for 
close to thirteen hours to stop the passage of a bill.195 Although Davis 
did not tweet from the floor while she was filibustering or publish 
tweets that were defamatory,196 her prior tweets and the social media 
movement that they generated gave her cause more national attention 
than it likely would have received otherwise, since most mainstream 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(d)(1) (2008). 
192 Huefner, supra note 100 at 236-39; see supra Parts II and III. 
193 See supra Part III.  
194 State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Nix, 295 P.2d 286, 291 (Okla. 1956); 
Abercrombie v. McClung, 525 P.2d 594, 594 (Haw. 1974). 
195  Hoppe, supra note 1; Fernandez, supra note 1. 
196 Summers-Dawes, supra note 12. 
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media outlets did not cover the event until the following day, after the 
filibuster ended.197  
Up until this point, I have not made a distinction between social 
media usage while the legislator is actually on the congressional floor, 
in a congressional hearing, or in their congressional office, compared 
to being elsewhere. From a Westfall Act perspective, the difference of 
location likely does not have any bearing on the legislative immunity, 
so long as the Member of Congress is acting in their official capacity, 
not for personal or political reasoning, and is motivated, at least in 
part, by their role as a legislator.198 If using a public twitter account 
associated with their official capacity, then likely the Member of 
Congress is always acting in their role as legislator, especially since 
they can communicate with constituents from anywhere and at any 
time.  
However, in the Speech or Debate context, there may be a 
difference in how social media postings are treated depending on 
where the legislator was located when they posted online. For the 
U.S. Congress, this may not be an issue because Senate decorum rules 
currently prohibit cell phones and laptops, which presumably would 
also include tablets, from the Senate Chamber.199 However, the U.S. 
House of Representatives recently considered amending the decorum 
rules to allow these technologies into the chamber after a 
representative used a tablet to aid him in delivering a speech.200  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 See, e.g., Dewey, supra note 4.  
198 Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Council on Am. 
Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
199 RICHARD A. BAKER, TRADITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 17 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/Traditions.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 
2013); Tim Gray, iPad in the House! Congress May Embrace the Tablet, 
LIVESCIENCE (Dec. 30, 2010, 3:46 AM), http://www.livescience.com/10355-ipad-
house-congress-embrace-tablet.html; Kathryn Lucero, Twoops! Romney-Ryan 
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FOUND, REPORTING GROUP  (Aug. 15, 2012, 6:11 PM), 
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200 Gray, supra note 199.  
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Given that many people consider these technologies 
indispensible in their day’s activity, a change to these decorum 
policies may not be far off. If this comes to fruition, social media 
messages may be considered protected by virtue of the legislator 
making them from the chamber. This would be a very liberal reading 
of the term “legislative act.” If being present in the House Chamber is 
considered a legislative act in and of itself because the representative 
is participating in the creation of legislation simply by being present 
and listening to debate, then it is possible that any social media 
messaging posted would be protected based on this notion, regardless 
of the content of the post.201  
To illustrate the interaction of the Comment’s overall analytical 
framework, consider the following example. A federal legislator 
publishes a defamatory tweet and Facebook status about one of her 
fellow members of Congress. The defamed member of Congress 
would pursue lawsuits against Twitter and Facebook for publishing 
libel, and the member of Congress making the remarks for libel. The 
claims against Twitter and Facebook would fail because Twitter and 
Facebook are protected under the First Amendment as service 
providers that are not responsible for editing the content its users 
post.202 The cause of action that the defamed Member of Congress is 
more likely to win would be that the legislator posting the tweet did 
not make the defamatory remark in the course of legislative activity. 
If the United States’ courts perceive the online speech made with a 
nexus of connection to the official duties of the Member of Congress, 
then there is no liability under the Westfall Act.203 However, if the 
actor in question is a state legislator posting online, then there is no 
Westfall protection, narrowing the scope of protected legislative 
activity, and opening the legislator to a greater likelihood of 
liability.204    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204-05 (1880); United States v. 
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966) 
202 See supra notes 162-165 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra Part IV. 
204 See supra Parts II and VI.  
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CONCLUSION 
Social media has changed the world that we live in by being 
able to make constant updates on life as it happens, and the capacity 
to interact with people all over the world. Social media also impacts 
how legislators interact with their constituents by allowing 
constituents to have much greater access to their representatives. In 
return, government is becoming a more interactive process as people 
like Wendy Davis capitalize on this medium to build a broader 
network of people that listen and interact with legislators’ ideas. Old 
frameworks, like the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, 
have not yet been interpreted in this new context. As legislatures use 
social media, there will inevitably be misuses, which would require a 
new light to shine on these doctrines. However, legislators, at least on 
a federal level, may find adequate protection in the existing structures. 
The general acceptance of social media by nearly all legislators makes 
social networking a vital part of their platform to fairly serve and 
protect their country.  
